"A Bridge Too Far"

The Operation Market-Garden plan was that the British Army, in a surprise attack, would break out of the bridgehead and control the main roads leading from there, via the city of Eindhoven, to the city of Nijmegen and then to Arnhem. US Airborne troops would be dropped further up the road near the villages of Son, Veghel, Uden and Grave in order to take by surprise the bridges spanning the many canals and small rivers, and those over the Rivers Maas (Meuse) and Waal near Nijmegen. They were to be taken intact, protected and defended, so that, when the British ground forces reached them, the column would be able to drive on immediately. The Nijmegen bridge, spanning River Waal was also to be taken by the US Airborne troops (The Screaming Eagles) but the Arnhem bridge over the Rhine was allocated to the British Airborne troops (the Red Devils) and the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade.

Regretfully, some mistakes were made:

1. The German resistance on the ground was badly underestimated and though the Americans were dropped almost on top of the smaller bridges, the troops to take the Nijmegen road and railway bridge landed too far south of the city and too far away from the Waal Bridges. They met heavy German resistance and failed to take the bridges as quickly as planned, on the very first day.

   Arnhem and the "Bridge Too Far"

2. The British ground forces, on their way to Nijmegen, were delayed by the Germans and contact with the Americans was made much later than intended. But, together, they took the road bridge. The Germans had undermined the bridge, but a Nijmegen Rover Scout, Jan van Hoof, a Resistance fighter, had managed to cut the wires, so when the Nazis pushed the plunger, the bridge did not blow up and the British tanks were able to race across and move in the direction of Arnhem - meeting, however, the increasing and fierce resistance of the remainders of two German SS-Panzer divisions. These had been beaten in France and what was left of them had been withdrawn and taken to the forests to the north of Arnhem, not because the German High Command expected an attack in that area, so far behind the frontlines, but to recuperate and re-arm in peace and quiet. The Dutch Resistance had spotted them and reported their presence to the Allied High Command, but the messages had not been taken seriously. Furthermore, the Brits and the Poles landed too far away from the Arnhem road and railway bridges, just like the Yanks did at Nijmegen. This was a serious mistake.
3. The British Airbornes, (the troops that Jay had met) were not aware of the SS-Panzer divisions' presence. Though having landed too far away from the bridges, during the early confusion and the heavy air attacks on the German targets, they moved forward in their direction. Arriving at the first bridge, which the railway crossed, they blew it up and it tumbled into the River Rhine. But only a small group, under the command of John Frost, reached the road bridge in Arnhem city centre. They were able to take positions covering the northern end of the bridge, but the Germans had recovered and from the south bank opened fire and prevented the British from crossing and taking the bridge. So they had to dig in on the northern bank and wait for the relieving forces to arrive from the south. These, however, were badly delayed. To the paratroopers utter surprise, the SS-Panzers then appeared on the scene and the group near the bridge was cut off and surrounded. Neither reinforcement nor supplies reached them. The British Red Devils, supposed to hold the bridge for two days as planned, stuck it out in the end for 10 days. Many were killed and most of the rest were wounded (including John Frost) during the hand-to-hand fighting with the SS. Frost and the few survivors at the bridge had to surrender and were taken to hospitals and German PoW camps.
4. Though the valiant British paratroopers did their best, The Battle of Arnhem was not a success; there were several factors:
   1. The dropping zones were too far away from the Arnhem road and railway bridges. Dutch officers, serving in the Free Dutch Forces in Britain, had told the Allied Command that the troops could easily be dropped immediately south of the bridges, almost on top the embankments, but their advice had been ignored.
   2. The Allied command had also ignored the Resistance reports regarding the recovering SS tank regiments. The lightly-armed Airborne troops could not match the German Panzers.
   3. When the Dutch Resistance found out that the British soldiers had trouble with their radio transmitters and could neither contact England nor the British and American troops in Nijmegen, they told the British officers that they had the possibility of reaching Nijmegen by phone, as the normal phone system was still operating* and later, when the Germans had cut it off, the Underground operated some special lines. The Nijmegen Underground could have provided a direct link to the British artillery in Nijmegen and its shooting could have been directed from Arnhem by phone. For some reason or other the British officers did not trust the offer and failed to use the opportunity.

(* A Dutch Commando in the Green Berets, attached to the British paratroopers, whilst resting in a deserted apartment, saw the phone, dialled his parents' number in The Hague and, to his surprise, got through to them.)

General Sosabowski, commanding the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade had expressed his doubts. He thought the plan very risky and, as he said, "A Bridge Too Far." No one listened to him. But in the end he was proved right.